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"DANCING IN THE DARK":
A review of Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day's
Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women:
One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?
(Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of
Women, 1989).
by
Brenda Cossman*
The following article argues that while Brodsky and Day's study
of the first three years of equality litigation under the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms is an important contribution in revealing
the extent to which equality rights have been used by men rather
than women and other disadvantaged groups, it fails to adequately
interrogate the role of rights discourse in feminist struggles for
social change. After reviewing the debates regarding rights dis-
course, the article argues that feminist litigation strategies must
be informed by a more complicated understanding of the role
of rights, and must be made accountable to the broader social
movement.
Danser dans le noir
Le present article trouve que l'tude par Brodsky et Day sur
le litige pour l'galitg pendant les trois premieres ann~es de la
Charte des droits et libertis constitue une contribution importante
a ce sujet, car elle rLvie a quel point les droits a l'6galitg ont
t utilises par les hommes plut~t que par lesfemmes et les autres
groupes d~favorises. Toutefois, elle n'examine pas assez le r6le
que le discours sur les droits joue dans la lutte fhministe pour
le changement sociaL L'article passe en revue les d~bats autour
du discours sur les droits, puis soutient que les strategies de litige
frministes doivent &tre informdes par une comprihension plus
complexe du rble des droits et doivent etre responsables envers
le mouvement social plus large.
I. Introduction
In their recent study, Canadian Charter Equality Rights For Women.
One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?, Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh
Day report on the performance of section 15 of the Charter during
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its first three years., They set out to answer some basic questions:
"How are women using the Charter? How are the courts interpreting
the equality guarantees? Are the guarantees helping women? What
factors will determine whether women are helped by the Charter
in the long run?"2 In answering those questions, Brodsky and Day
reveal the extent to which sexual equality rights under the Charter
have been used by men rather than women and other disadvantaged
groups, illustrate the formal theory of equality that has produced
those results, and argue that a substantive model of equality must
be adopted to ensure that the Charter does not ultimately represent
"two steps back" for the struggles of Canadian women.3 The study
is both impressive and important; particularly in so far as it provides
invaluable documentation of the use of the sexual equality guaran-
tees, and indeed the equality guarantees more generally, over the
first three years of the Charter's existence. However, One Step
Forward leaves some important implications of its findings unin-
terrogated, and consequently, as a strategy for feminist engagement
with the law, the study is less helpful. Rather than considering the
broader question of the role of rights discourse in feminist struggles
for social change, Brodsky and Day conclude that the problem has
been primarily doctrinal, and as a result they remain firmly com-
mitted to the use of equality rights in those struggles.
II. Report on the Charter Equality Rights
As Brodsky and Day conclude - "the news is not good".4 Their
study reveals that less than 10% of equality rights decisions deal
with sex discrimination, that is, only 44 cases of the 591 equality
Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women;
One Step Forward or Two Steps Back? (Canadian Advisory Council on the
Status of Women, 1989) (hereinafter - One Step Forward).
2 Id, 3.
3 At the outset, the authors specifically turn their attention to the relationship
between gender and other forms of oppression in women's lives including
race, disability, sexual orientation and religion. While they recognize the
fundamental importance of acknowledging the interlocking nature of these
oppressions, they further note the limitations of their study in this regard
in as far as "cases that challenge the particular complex of disadvantage
experienced by women of colour or women with disabilities, for example,
are virtually absent from the courts" (Id., 4). Notwithstanding this limitation,
Brodsky and Day argue that the substantive approach to equality advocated
by them can accomodate the multiple forms of discrimination that women
experience. While this approach to equality may well be both broad enough
and contextual enough to do so, the limitations of the study must not be
understated. Until such time as the experiences of women of colour, women
with disabilities and other women who experience such interlocking oppression
are specifically considered, we would be well advised to limit such gener-
alizations. Moreover, notwithstanding the best intentions of the authors, it
is essential to recognize the limitation is such that references to the all-
inclusive category of "women" throughout the study are based on the
experience of white, able bodied women.
4 Id, 3.
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decisions5 Further, they document the extent to which these sexual
equality rights have been used by men rather than women:
Only nine of the sex equality challenges were made by or on behalf
of women. The other thirty five challenges were made by or on
behalf of men.6
In reviewing these cases, Brodsky and Day note that, although
women's success rate has been higher than men's, "because there
are more men's sex equality challenges men's successes have been
more than double those of women".7 The broader context of equality
decisions reflects similar patterns. The study found that only 189
of the 591 decisions raised grounds of disadvantage, and moreover,
that only 66 of these cases were initiated by or on behalf of dis-
advantaged persons.8
Brodsky and Day argue that two factors underlie the extent to
which sexual equality rights in particular have been used by men,
rather than women. In their view, the most significant factor is
the approach to equality adopted by the courts. Until very recently
the courts have overwhelmingly adopted a very formal model of
equality, a model which is ill-suited to guarantee real equality
for minority and disadvantaged groups. Brodsky and Day illustrate
both the narrow approach to comparability and the rendering of
disadvantage virtually invisible within this model.9 According to
this approach, all individuals who are similarly situated are to be
treated the same. Any differentiation in treatment is only justified
if the parties are not similarly situated, that is, if they are not the
same. Equality is equated with sameness. Women and men are
equal if they are treated the same. Therefore, when women and
men are not similarly situated, then they are not entitled to equality,
even if the difference in their situation is the produce of historic
and systemic disadvantage.10 According to this limited model of
equality, these gender differences based on disadvantage preclude
equality.
A second and related factor is access to the courts." Brodsky
and Day argue that "women in Canada do not have adequate access
to the use of Charter rights"12 and accordingly, argue that a
substantive model of equality can only be guaranteed if women
and other disadvantaged groups are ensured substantive access to
the courts:
5 Brodsky and Day report at page 49 that while there were in total 52 cases,
this number is reduced to 44 cases "when appeals and other additional
proceedings related to any one case are discounted".
6 Id, 49.
7 Id, 56.
8 Id, 117-119.
9 1d, 117-151.
10 1d, 151-165.
11 Id, 131-140.
12 Id, 131.
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Questions of access are crucial because they determine who can
make their voices heard in the courts and who can participate in
shaping the interpretations of the new equality guarantees. 13
In their view the problem is two fold. Firstly, a generous approach
to both standing and intervenor status must be adopted by the Courts.
While the rules of standing have recently been relaxed, Brodsky
and Day note that it is not yet clear whether non-profit/non-
governmental organizations will be allowed to initiate proceedings
on women's behalf. Further, they argue that a similar broadening
of the rules governing intervention, particularly to public interest
interventions, must be adopted. Secondly, adequate funding must
be made available to women and other disadvantaged groups.
Brodsky and Day argue that a model of substantive equality must
be adopted by the courts in interpreting the equality guarantees
of the Charter.14 In their view, a substantive model of equality would:
... focus on the problem of substantive inequality and not on
sameness or difference of treatment; appreciate that the interest of
true equality may require differentiation in treatment; and reject
reasonableness as a qualification on equality rights.'5
They further argue that a distinction must be made between claims
based on substantive inequality and other equality claims.16
By way of a postscript, Brodsky and Day argue that the recent
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Andrews'7 is encouraging,
in so far as the Court "introduced the concept of disadvantage
to section 15 analysis and has made human rights principles and
jurisprudence a source for interpretation". 18 They note the limitations
of the decision. They are critical of the vagueness with which the
concept of disadvantage was discussed by the Supreme Court of
Canada, the continuing narrow scope of the Charter, the on-going
debate within the Court of the applicability of section 1, and the
failure to expressly reject the formal model of equality underlying
the similarly situated test. 19 However, Brodsky and Day conclude
that in the aftermath of Andrews, it is only more "essential that
women and other disadvantaged groups now increase their efforts
to put their views and experiences before the Court so that the
Mark Andrews decision can be built on".20
This is not the only conclusion that might be drawn from these
findings. Indeed, the authors themselves note that the conclusions
of the study might be seen to support a much more critical position
on the Charter. After briefly referring to several commentators who
13 Id, 131.
14 Id, 187-201.
15 Id, 190.
16 Id, 190.
17 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
18 Supra note 1, 209.
19 Id, 207-209.
20 Id, 210.
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have warned against disadvantaged groups resorting to Charter
rights and the courts in their struggles for social change, Brodsky
and Day nevertheless conclude that women must continue to press
for social change in both legislative and judicial forms:
S. . women have not chosen the courts as the sole forum in which
to seek advancement of their equality. Women are pressing govern-
ments actively and continually for improvements in laws and pro-
grams. Nor can women conclude from their experience that govern-
ments provide a better forum for their concerns; after all, governments,
like the courts, are unrepresentative and too often unresponsive to
women's needs. Because women's disadvantage is so entrenched,
women do not have the luxury of choosing one forum over the other.
The full support of both governments and the courts is needed to
take their rightful place in Canadian society. Women must press
for change in both arenas.2'
This conclusion may ultimately be quite legitimate. However, it
is not supported by sufficient consideration of the broader question
of the role of rights discourse in feminist struggles for social change.
Indeed there is a tension in their work between a recognition of
the critique of rights and their conclusion advocating a continued
reliance on this discourse. However, their view that the failure of
the Charter is primarily doctrinal precludes any further interrogation
of this broader issue. On further reflection of their findings, we
may need to problematize more than doctrine. We need to inter-
rogate the role of law, and the various factors that may operate
to limit the role of the law.
Ill. The Role of Rights Discourse Reconsidered - Again and Again
The question of the efficacy of rights discourse has recently
become the focus of considerable attention among feminists and
other critical scholars. Influenced by critical legal studies and/or
socialist approaches to law, some feminists have begun to rethink
the unproblematized reliance on rights in particular, and law in
general. Some have outrightly rejected rights, others have suggested
the need to understand the limited use of rights; and yet others
continue to defend the reliance on rights, albeit from a more
sophisticated understanding of the nature of rights, and the role
of rights discourse in feminist strategies.
In the United States, the debate within legal scholarship was first
articulated by the critical legal studies movement. CLS writers began
to question the efficacy of rights discourse in struggles for social
change.22 Rights have been considered to be individualistic and
formalistic. The critique is often associated with the broader critique
21 Id, 3-4.
22 See P. Gabel, "The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact
of the Withdrawn Selves" (1984), 62 Tex.LRev. 1563; Gabel and Harris
"Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice
of Law" (1982), 11 N.Y.URev. L& Soc.Change 369; Tushnet, "An Essay
on Rights" (1984), 62 Tex.LRev. 1363.
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of liberalism, and its impoverished conception of the individual as
an atomistic, voluntaristic self, defined only in opposition of others.
This focus on the separation of the self from the other, from the
community, is seen to undermine an understanding of interdepen-
dency and connection.
A similar debate has arisen within the context of Canadian legal
scholarship, specifically with regard to the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. Legal scholars within a socialist tradition have
argued that the Charter is not an effective tool for social change,
and moreover, that resort to the rights discourse of the Charter
may do more harm than good. Some have argued that Charter
rights are negative by their nature, that is, they are capable only
of restricting state power, not conferring positive benefits.23 As a
construct of a social discourse representing the interests of the
dominant class, rights discourse could not represent the interest
of disadvantaged and marginalized groups. Glasbeek and Mandel
argue that the enactment of the Charter has resulted in the
legalization of politics - issues have been translated into the abstract
discourse of law and rights and thereby deprived of their political
force and character.24 Some argue that the role of law itself is to
prevent social change and that the translation of issues into rights
is a mechanism by which law so maintains the status quo.2 Moreover
even apart from a direct critique of rights, reliance on courts for
23 Andrew Petter, "Legitimizing Sexual Inequality: Three Early charter Cases"
(1989), 34 McGill LJ. 358, 358-9 ("[the] thesis ... is that the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a regressive instrument whose coherence
and legitimacy depend upon the values and assumptions of nineteenth century
liberalism. Like other liberal rights documents, the Charter equips individuals
with a formal set of negative rights enabling them to repel interference
by the regulatory and redistributive arms of the state. At the same time,
it provides no opportunity for challenging the major source of inequality
in our society: unequal distribution of property.") See also A.C. Hutchinson
and A.Petter, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter"
(1988), 38 U. Toronto LR 278; A.C. Hutchinson, "Charter Litigation and
Social Change: Legal Battles and Social Wars" in R.J.Sharpe, ed., Charter
Litigation (1987).
24 H. Glasbeek and M. Mandel, "The Legalization of Politics in Advanced
Capitalism: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1984), 2
Socialist Studies/Etudes Socialistes 84, 87 ("... the legal technique actually
obscures issues by dealing with them in abstractions that are meant to disguise
the political nature of the choices being made"). See also M. Mandel, The
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Legalization of Politics in Canada
(1989) and M. Mandel, "Marxism and the Rule of Law" (1986), 35 UN.B.LJ.,
7.
25 Harry Glasbeek, "Some Strategies for an Unlikely Task: The Progressive
Use of Law" (1989), 21 Ottawa LRev. 387, 393: "It is my argument that
while some reforms are obtainable through judicial activity, they are limited
in scope and impact because fundamental changes cannot be yielded by
our legal system. The ultimate purpose of law is to prevent radical change
and, most importantly, the judiciary has a leading part to play in the
maintenance of the status quo".
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the vindication of rights is also considered problematic. Courts,
it is argued, are elitist, conservative and undemocratic institutions;
judges unable to transcend their perspectives as white, upper-middle
class, conservative men. Thus, the judicial institution itself is argued
to be the antithesis of social change.
The critique of rights and of the legal discourse more generally
has been met with considerable controversy, and in the United States
has given rise to what has become known as the critique of the
critique of rights, or the minority response to the critique of rights.
"Minorities", that is, the term referring to women, non-white men,
and other disadvantaged groups who constitute an overwhelming
majority of the world's population, challenged the proclamations
of the political inefficacy of rights from the white male academics
who formed the core CLS group. The critique of rights was argued
to reflect the privileged position of white, middle class, male authors;
only those who had rights could imagine the luxury of giving them
away. Black feminists such as Patricia Williams defend the political
necessity of reliance on rights discourse for those black women,
like herself, who have always been denied rights. 26 Black women,
and other disadvantaged groups have never been afforded the
protection of individual rights, of the rule of law or of full legal
personality. While those who have achieved such protection may
be in a position to argue that it is insufficient to guarantee full
and substantive equality, those who have been denied even the
protection of formal equality are not so privileged. Williams argues
that rights therefor remain an important political signifier.27
Elizabeth Schneider has responded similarly to the critique of
rights from her perspective and experience within the women's
movement. 28 Schneider argues that reliance on rights discourse has
been an important and effective political strategy for feminists,
although she does so from a perspective that problematizes the
traditional conception of rights. She argues that rights must be seen
as part of a political strategy - she challenges the traditional
distinction between law and politics, and argues that feminists must
approach rights discourse with an understanding of the dialectical
26 Patricia Williams, "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Decon-
structed Rights" (1987), 22 Harv.C.R-C.LLRev. 401. See also R.A. Williams,
"Taking Rights Agressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory
for Peoples of Colour" (1987), 5 Law and Inequality 103; R. Delgado, "The
Ethereal Scholar Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?"
(1987), 22 Harvard C.R-C.LLRev. 301.
27 Williams, id, 414: "The black experience of anonymity, the estrangement
of being without a name, has been one of living in the oblivion of society's
inverse, beyond the dimension of any consideration at all. Thus, the experience
of rights-assertion has been one of both solidarity and freedom, of em-
powerment of an internal and very personal sort: it has been a process
of finding the self'.
28 Elizabeth Schneider, "The Dialectics of Rights and Politics: Perspectives
for the Women's Movement" (1986), 61 N. Y.ULRev. 589.
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relationship between rights and politics. 29 According to Schneider,
rights discourse can be important in consciousness-raising, in
mobilizing marginalized groups and in providing these groups with
a powerful language with which to voice and legitimize their
demands. 30 Like Williams, Schneider grants considerable importance
to the symbolic power that rights claims represent in current political
discourse and sees this power as efficacious in feminist struggles
for social change.
Other feminists remain more critical of rights, and sceptical of
the efficacy of rights discourse in feminist struggles for social change.
Carol Smart, for example, while recognizing both the attraction
of rights discourse and the contribution of rights struggles for
feminists in the past, suggests that "the rhetoric of rights has become
exhausted and may even be detrimental".31 Smart argues that
resorting to rights can "oversimplify complex power relations", and
give the impression that acquiring rights has in fact resolved power
differentials.32 Furthermore, she argues that "rights formulated to
protect the individual against the state, or the weak against the
strong, may be appropriated by the more powerful". 33
In a similar vein, Judy Fudge directly challenges many of Elizabeth
Schneider's views on the efficacy of rights.34 Fudge challenges the
29 Id, 611: "Rights discourse and rights claims, when emerging from and
organically linked to political struggle, can help to develop political con-
sciousness which can play a useful role in the development of a social
movement". See also the work of Ed Sparer, "Fundamental Rights, Legal
Entitlement and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical
Legal Studies Movement" (1984), 36 Star.LR 509. At page 560 Sparer
writes: "Various kinds of legal rights and entitlements may be used in a
manner that helps to develop social movement .... The meaning of a right
or entitlement depends upon the way in which it intertwines with social
movement".
30 Id, 611-62: "Rights discourse can express human and communal values;
it can be a way for individuals to develop a sense of self and for a group
to develop a collective identity. Rights discourse can also have a dimension
that emphasizes the interdependence of autonomy and community. It can
play an important role in giving individual a sense of self-definition, in
connecting the individual to the larger group and community, and in defining
the goals of a political struggle, particularly during the early development
of a social movement." Martha Minow, "Interpreting Rights: An Essay for
Robert Cover" (1987), 96 Yale LJ. 1860, similarly speaks of rights as a
language through which both individuals and groups claim both legitimacy
and membership in the community. She writes, at page 1884, note 94: "... the
language of rights offers some hope: It is the language of protest, made
legitimate by the powerful, even for use by the powerless".
31 Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (1989), 139.
32 Id, 144.
33 Id, 145.
34 Judy Fudge, "The Efficacy of Entrenching a Bill of Rights Upon Political
Discourse" (1989), 17 International J. of the Soc. of Law 445, 448: "I want
to propose an alternative, less sanguine, analysis which focuses on the nature
of the political discourse generated by the assertion of abstract legal rights.
Schneider's analysis ignores the impact this form of politics has upon the
1990
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role of rights in feminist mobilization based on the Canadian
experience in the first few years following the enactment of the
Charter:
Various anti-feminist groups have employed the Charter as a political
symbol to mobilise opposition to affirmative action for women, to
win fathers a say in abortion, to protect the rights of the foetus, and
to secure more rights for those accused of sexual assault. This suggests
that to the extent that the Charter can be used as a symbol for political
mobilisation by feminists, it can also be used by groups and organ-
isations which are directly opposed to a feminist political agenda.35
She argues that there is nothing in rights discourse that in any
way "precludes its use as a political symbol by a wider variety
of groups which seek to attack" various forms of legislation intended
to benefit historically disadvantaged groups. 36 Fudge concludes that
it is not possible to evaluate the effect of the Charter only in terms
of mobilization. She suggests that it must further be evaluated "with
reference to the form of political discourse constitutional litigation
generates".37 With regard to the legal regulation of sexual violence
for example, she argues that the effect of the Charter has been
to narrow the debate, without challenging the existing discourse
of sexuality.38
Indeed, Fudge's work provides an interesting contrast to Brodsky
and Day. In an earlier work, Fudge reviewed the sexual equality
decisions under the Charter.39 Like Brodsky and Day's study, her
examination of these cases revealed that the sexual equality gua-
rantees have been no cause for celebration for feminist struggles.
Indeed, she argued that the reliance on sexual equality rights has
been politically damaging for women. However, in her view the
problem was not simply one on the level of doctrine. Rather, she
argued that the public/private distinction has operated to preclude
the Charter from bringing about any meaningful social change.
This is not to say that Brodsky and Day do not recognize the
problematic implications of the public/private distinction in respect
of the application of the Charter. In fact, they state that:
The tendency of the courts to make a public private distinction in
relation to the Charter is an important issue for women because
nature of political discourse generated by the assertion of abstract legal
rights. Rather than regarding the fact of mass mobilisation as positive per
se, it is important to examine how abstract legal rights function as the basis
for coalitions or mobilisation".
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id, 450.
38 Id, 459: "the social construction of sexuality and the social relations of
power in which sexual relations of practices take place fade into the
background".
39 j. Fudge, "The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities and Limitations
to the Use of Charter Litigation in Further Feminist Struggles" (1987), 25
Osgoode Hall L J. 485.
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it is central in determining how useful the Charter will be in
overcoming inequality.... This public private distinction may rob
women of the full benefits of section 15 and 28. The problem that
women have in too many situations is not that government is acting
in a directly abusive fashion, but that government is doing nothing
or not doing enough to stop discrimination against women. Cutting
off the application of the Charter to the so-called private sphere
is another way of failing to stop the discrimination against women.40
Yet their response is not less Charter, but more Charter. In their
view, a more expansive approach to the Charter must be adopted
in which equality guarantees are extended to the private sphere.
There is however little discussion of the deeper implications of this
distinction beyond the question of the scope of the Charter. In
contrast, Fudge problematizes not only the distinction, but further,
the extent to which the distinction is constitutive of the liberal
discourse informing the Charter and thus unavoidable once we enter
into rights discourse. She explores how the public/private distinction
has operated as an obstacle to women's struggles for substantive
equality in less obvious ways.4'
Thus, this question of the relevance of the public/private distinction
in Charter litigation is but one example of the need to further
interrogate the role of rights discourse in feminist struggles for social
change, rather than simply accepting rights as the terrain on which
to conduct these struggles. However, it is important to note that
neither "side" of the debate about rights tells a simple story. Even
those who argue against the efficacy of rights discourse are not
willing to surrender the terrain entirely. Fudge, for example, argues:
... it is essential to understand that Charter litigation, although at
times a necessary arena of struggle, is not in itself sufficient to achieve
substantive equality. However, it is equally important to understand
that liberal rights are contradictory and insufficient rather than illusory
and the struggle for social transformation may often involve pushing
bourgeois forms of legality to their limit. Feminists must be vigilant
against allowing litigation to dominate the political and social struggle
to obtain substantive equality for women, because the tendency of
litigation strategies is to transform politics into a series of narrow
issues packaged as private and individual cases. 42
40 Brodsky and Day, supra note 1, 91.
41 Fudge, supra note 39, 551: "The public/private distinction has operated
in a variety of ways to exclude judicial scrutiny of the private sphere of
the market, to reinforce the naturalistic ideology of familism and to emphasize
women's biological vulnerablity while ignoring men's socio-sexual
agression."
42 Id, 548. Stephen Brickley and Elizabeth Comack in "The Role of Law
in Social Transformation: Is a Jurisprudence of Insurgency Possible?" (1987),
2 Law and Society 97, similarly argue that there are important reasons for
not abandoning law. At page 104, they write: "'law is not simply imposed
upon people but is also a product and object of and provides an arena
which circumscribes class (and other types of) struggle'. Indeed, the rights
enshrined in law were not simply handed down by a benevolent state, but
were the outcomes of progressive struggles by the subordinated classes."
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As Carol Smart concludes ". . . law remains a site of struggle".43
Equally, those who defend rights discourse as useful recognize that
it is not the only terrain for feminist struggles. As Schneider, for
example, acknowledges ". . . rights, although they must vigorously
be fought for, cannot perform the task of social reconstruction".44
We need to tell more complicated stories about rights. As Patricia
Williams writes:
What is needed ... is not the abandonment of rights language for
all purposes, but an attempt to become multilingual in the semantics
of each others' rights valuation.45
Didi Herman, in reviewing the debates regarding the use of rights
discourse and considering its role in struggles for lesbian and gay
liberation, speaks similarly of the need to complicate our under-
standing of rights:
Perhaps we need to retreat from an either/or position. Rights ...
mean different things to different people. In asserting the efficacy
of rights claims, it may be helpful to distinguish between various
kinds of rights, their initiating process, and the way a social movement
takes up a particular rights struggle as a political mobilizer. We
need to appreciate the particular circumstances where rights claims
are necessary, strategic and even empowering, and acknowledge that
the acquisition of formal rights may be a precondition for more
substantive or fundamental change. Yet, at the same time, we may
need a heightened awareness at the pitfalls of rights discourse. 46
The question is not therefore one of negating or abandoning the
role of rights claims in feminist struggles, as more straight forward
critiques of rights often imply, nor is it one of uncritically adopting
rights as the focus of feminist struggles. It is rather a question of
interrogating if, when and how rights claims ought to be used. The
critique of rights, and the attempt by women and other disadvantaged
groups to respond to these critiques, are useful in achieving this
more sophisticated and strategic understanding of the utility of rights
discourse. We need to understand what we can reasonably expect
from using rights discourse, if we decide to use it. We need to
anticipate the consequences, and to formulate political strategies
to meet the shortcomings of a rights based strategy.
Indeed, the idea that social movements can avoid the law is
unrealistic. Clearly, the law may directly stand in the way of our
43 Smart, supra note 31, 88: "While it is the case that law does not hold
the key to unlock patriarchy, it provides the forum for articulating alternative
visions and accounts". At page 165, Smart further concludes: "Law cannot
be ignored precisely because of its power to define, but feminism's strategy
should be focused on this power rather than on constructing legal policies
which only legitimate the legal forum and the form of law."
44 Schneider, supra note 28, 651.
45 Williams, supra note 26, 410.
46 Didi Herman "Are We Family? Lesbian Rights and Women's Liberation"
(1990), 28 Osgoode Hall Law School 789, 809.
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struggles, or the law may be called upon by others, as Brodsky
and Day rightly note, leaving women with no choice but to engage
with it. But there are more politically viable ways of participating
in legal discourse. For example, we can attempt to develop feminist
litigation strategies that are accountable to the broader social
movement. Effective use of the dialectical relationship between law
and politics described by Schneider and others demands such
contextualization and accountability. Legal battles must be located
within the larger political struggle and must make sense in terms
of the more general, less specifically legal objectives of such a
struggle. Long term political objectives, as developed by the social
movement must not be lost to the shorter term objectives of litigation
strategies. 47 Without such linkage, we risk both isolating and reifying
the struggles in the legal forum. There is, moreover, the constant
danger that the social movement will itself become legalized -
its agenda will beset by lawyers and individual plaintiffs rather
than by the women organized as a collective political force, and
the effect may well be demobilization rather than mobilization.
Making feminist litigation strategies so accountable may help avoid
many of the disadvantages associated with rights discourse.
We need to recognize that our litigation strategies cannot be
measured in doctrine alone. For example, if we defend rights at
least partially in terms of their role in mobilization, then we must
directly explore the impact of particular litigation strategies in these
terms. Consider the following cases. In Symes v. Canada,48 the
plaintiff, a self-employed woman lawyer, used section 15 of the
Charter to argue that the Income Tax Act, which did not allow
deductions for child care expenses as a business expense, violated
her sexual equality rights. The Federal Court found that the high
cost of day care "constitutes a barrier to women's access to the
economy", and held that self-employed parents ought to be allowed
to deduct their child care expenses. In Morgantaler v. The Queen,49
section 7 of the Charter was used to strike down the restrictions
on access to abortion in section 251 of the Criminal Code.
Both of these cases might be seen as victories. Measured solely
in doctrinal terms, Symes might even be seen as a greater victory
than Morgantaler, in so far as the Court recognized what might
be seen as a positive right. However, when seen in the broader
context of the impact on the social movements, the contrast between
the cases is striking. Within the broader context of the child care
movement, the Symes case can hardly be heralded as a victory.
47 I have discussed this tension between long term political objectives, and
short term litigation strategies in the context of the abortion rights movement
in B. Cossman, "The Precarious Unity of Feminist Theory and Practice:
The Praxis of Abortion" (1986), 44 UTFac.LRev. 85, 95-108; See also
Elizabeth Kingdom, "Legal Recognition of a Woman's Right To Choose"
Brophy & Smart, eds., Women in Law (1985).
48 EC. Symes v. Canada, [1989] 1 C.T.C.477 (F.C.C.A.).
49 Morgantaler v. The Queen (1988), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
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It has divided the child care lobby, and indeed, significantly
demobilized a powerful section of that lobby - upper income, self
employed professional parents - who stand to benefit from the
business expense deduction.50
The Morgantaler case, on the other hand, when viewed in the
broader context of the abortion rights struggle has been far more
successful. An interaction between the use of rights and the
mobilization of a mass social movement that has pressured go-
vernment and public opinion is clearly visible. While it has been
argued that the Morgantaler case has legalized the political struggle,51
there has nevertheless been a closer relationship between the legal
and political struggles than is evident in cases such as Symes. The
legal struggle has been used to build and support a social movement,
and the social movement has been used to build and support the
legal struggle. It is an example of the dialectical relationship between
law and politics advocated by Schneider.52
These two cases further highlight the extent to which, as Fudge
argued, rights are contradictory, and in turn, the extent to which
we must, as further suggested by Williams and Herman, complicate
our understandings of rights. If we think of rights as conversations,
then we must consider the construction of meaning within those
conversations. If we think of rights as a form of political discourse,
then we must consider the implications of that discourse for our
politics. If we think of rights as a means of mobilizing for political
action, then we must explore the social movement justifying the
rights strategies. If we think of rights as complex and contradictory,
then we must be able to think of all these and many other dimensions
of rights at the same time. We need to recognize these contradictions
as we struggle to make rights strategies accountable to a broader
feminist social movement.
IV. Conclusion
There is no question, as Brodsky and Day argue, that without
a guarantee of substantive access and a doctrinal approach to
substantive equality, the Charter will represent two steps back for
Canadian women. However, there is simply no guarantee that such
procedural and doctrinal shifts will result in a step forward. This
does not mean that resorting to the courts may not continue to
be an important dimension of the strategies of the women's
movement. In this regard, Brodsky and Day may be quite accurate.
But, it is essential that such litigation strategies be pursued in the
context of, and be accountable to, the broader women's movement.
50 Moreover, the case only further reinforces the privatization of child care
and the use of foreign domestics to care for the children of upper income
families. I am indebted to my colleague, Judy Fudge, for these insights.
51 Mandel, supra note 24.
52 For a discussion of the tensions between the legal strategies and the longer
term feminist objectives, see Cossman, supra note 47.
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We need to recognize that the equality rights of the Charter will
neither clearly represent a step forward, nor a step back for women
and other disadvantaged groups. The results of recourse to these
rights are, and will continue to be contradictory. It is only by stepping
beyond the reductionist analysis of either/or that we will be able
to evaluate the impact of the Charter on feminist struggles. Indeed,
steps forward, backwards, or even sideways are ultimately only
steps in the dark, until we consider these steps in the context of
the contradictions of rights discourse, and of feminist struggles for
social change.
